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Jurisdictional approaches have become popular in international forums as promising
strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions caused by deforestation and to
guarantee sustainable commodity supply. Yet, despite their growing popularity, up
to now, there is little consensus on how such approaches should move forward
in specific jurisdictions. In this paper we examine two contrasting municipal-level
case studies in the eastern Amazonian state of Pará where jurisdiction-wide efforts
are underway to reduce deforestation. By developing detailed forest governance
intervention timelines since 2005, conducting semi-structured interviews with key
informants, analyzing municipal deforestation trends, plus extensive examination of
project reports, governmental documents and other secondary sources, this paper
performs two main analyses. First, it characterizes the processes in each municipality
by linking context and forest governance intervention timelines to deforestation trends.
Second it provides a systematic comparison of processes based on (1) the role
of the government, (2) multi-stakeholder participation and inclusiveness, (3) adaptive
management, (4) horizontal and vertical coordination, and (5) alignment of public and
private (supply-chain) initiatives. In so doing, this article answers some of the imperative
questions on how to implement and improve jurisdictional approaches aimed at halting
deforestation in the tropics.
Keywords: REDD+, supply-chain initiatives, forest governance, multi-stakeholder participation, adaptive
management, third-tier jurisdictions
INTRODUCTION
Progress toward more sustainable land use in ways that contribute to economic development
and social equity, has long been a priority in tropical landscapes (Jong et al., 2010). Yet, lately,
much of the sustainability debate has been dominated by the urgent need to reduce deforestation
given the importance of standing forests and other ‘natural climate solutions’ in helping mitigate
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catastrophic climate change (Griscom et al., 2017; IPCC,
2019). Policy perspectives to tackle Amazonian deforestation
have multiple origins linked to wider conservation and
development agendas. While conservationists have argued in
favor of expanding protected areas or securing indigenous
and local community tenure rights to deter commercial
agricultural expansion and to preserve mature forests exposed
to encroachment (Nepstad et al., 2006; Soares-Filho et al.,
2010), developmentalists have favored incentives for farmers to
improve their production practices while complying with land
use regulations (Börner et al., 2014; Cunha et al., 2016). In
addition, growing demand for agricultural commodities, along
with growing competitiveness of agriculture in frontier lands,
calls for sustainable interventions by supply chains (Gibbs et al.,
2016; Lambin et al., 2018) to complement state regulations and
policies for forest conservation.
The Brazilian Amazon is a key landscape where these
multiple approaches have been tested, making the country a
laboratory of governance innovations. Through many ambitious
policies, three levels of Brazilian governments (federal, state, and
municipal), the private sector, and civil society organizations
were able to engage in reducing Amazonian deforestation in an
unprecedented way. Federal policies like the Plan of Action for
the Prevention Control of Deforestation in the Amazon in 2004,
and state-level initiatives like Pará’s Green Municipality Program
in 2011 (Whately and Campanili, 2013), to mention only a
few examples, were major developments, while private sector
arrangements such as the Soy Moratorium in 2006 and the Cattle
Agreement in 2009 gave a further impetus to tackle deforestation
(Gibbs et al., 2015; Gibbs et al., 2016). Together, these efforts
helped reduce Amazonian deforestation by more than 70%
since it peaked in 2004 (Godar et al., 2014; Assunção et al.,
2015) making Brazil the world’s largest contributor to reducing
emissions during this period (Seymour and Busch, 2016).
However, these efforts have failed to contain persisting
deforestation and have become less effective over time (Schielein
and Börner, 2018; Seymour and Harris, 2019). In 2013,
deforestation rates slowly started to increase again, and there
is a resurgence of concerns that the Amazon is closer to reach
a “tipping point”, particularly in the eastern and southern
portion of the Brazilian Amazon (Lovejoy and Nobre, 2019).
For some authors, the steady rise in deforestation is partly
linked to the ease with which actors involved in soy, beef
and timber production can circumvent government regulations
and commodity agreements (Carvalho et al., 2019) and a lack
of incentives needed to make forest conservation politically
sustainable (Nepstad et al., 2014). In this context, the concept
of jurisdictional approaches emerged as a way to tackle
deforestation in a more holistic way (Nepstad et al., 2013;
TFA, 2017; Boyd et al., 2018). In global debates, jurisdictional
approaches emerged from the recognition that international
efforts, such as those framed under REDD+ and/or sustainable
commodity supply-chain initiatives, were unable to overcome
institutional barriers at the landscape level, and thus far failed to
achieve the desired changes (Stickler et al., 2018).
Jurisdictional approaches are broadly defined as wall-to-wall
frameworks that seek to align governments, businesses, NGOs,
and local stakeholders in specific administrative jurisdictions
around common interests in land use governance (Fishman
et al., 2017; Boyd et al., 2018). They strongly resemble integrated
landscape approaches, but their key distinctive feature is a high
level of governmental involvement in a landscape that is defined
by policy-relevant boundaries (Ros-Tonen et al., 2018). There
are multiple scales where jurisdictional approaches may occur -
national, subnational, and local. A major recent focus has been on
the subnational level, especially in countries where subnational
jurisdictions have broad authority to reduce deforestation
(Busch and Amarjargal, 2020). Jurisdictional approaches also
have different foci. These include jurisdictional approaches
to zero deforestation commitments that are delinked from
governments (WWF, 2016), multi-stakeholder jurisdictional
programs (Hovani et al., 2018), and jurisdictional approaches
to REDD+ and low emissions development (Boyd et al.,
2018), among others.
The concept of jurisdictional approach is relatively new,
and its analysis is only emerging in the literature. Yet,
jurisdiction-wide efforts to reduce deforestation, in its broad
sense, irrespective of the extent of government involvement
or of how comprehensive the actions are, have been in place
for some time. In this paper, we analyze two contrasting
initiatives in the Brazilian municipalities of Paragominas and
São Félix do Xingu. Municipal-level initiatives have been in
place in the Brazilian Amazon at least since the late 2000s,
when some municipalities were targeted by federal government
strategies to reduce deforestation (Thaler et al., 2019). This was
triggered by Brazil’s highest deforesters list that defined priority
municipalities in order to tackle deforestation more effectively,
through command-and-control actions such as credit restrictions
and field-based law enforcement (Cisneros et al., 2015). Such
strategies included municipal government-led programs and
NGO interventions ranging from promoting environmental
capacity building of local actors to pilot testing sustainable
agricultural practices (Piketty et al., 2015; Gebara et al., 2019).
By analyzing the two cases, our aim is to contribute to
ongoing debates, analyses and implementation of jurisdictional
approaches to reduce deforestation. Further, we answer the
following questions: (1) who should be involved in the design
of jurisdictional approaches? (2) how should tradeoffs between
inclusiveness and effectiveness be addressed? (3) how can the
effectiveness of jurisdictional approaches be measured? (4) how
should local jurisdictional approaches align or be nested in higher
level approaches? (5) how can such approaches combine public
and private actions?
We focus on jurisdictional approaches at local scale as
these have received considerably less attention in the literature.
We do not assume that our case studies are necessarily
perfect illustrations of jurisdictional approaches but rather that
are insightful examples of the complexity of interventions
involving local governments in reducing deforestation in the
real world. The municipalities of Paragominas and São Félix
do Xingu were selected because they are emblematic cases of
contrasting pathways of forest governance where multiple state
and non-state efforts to curb deforestation have been undertaken
in the Brazilian Amazon, including governmental programs,
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NGO projects, and supply-chain initiatives. On the one hand,
Paragominas became known as a “success story” as the first
municipality to be taken off the list of highest deforesters through
an alliance involving the municipal government, NGOs, ranchers
and soy farmers (Sills et al., 2015; Viana et al., 2016). On the other
hand, despite many efforts and overall reduction in deforestation
rates São Félix do Xingu is still among the top deforestation sites
in the Brazilian Amazon (Schneider et al., 2015; Schmink et al.,
2017). An analysis of the processes to curb deforestation in these
two distinct municipalities provides lessons for both scholars
and practitioners in how to support jurisdictional approaches
moving forward.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section “Data Collection
and Analysis” we present the methodological approach, including
the analytical framework and the data collection methods. In
Section “Context” we provide a short background of the Brazilian
Amazon policy context and the socio-ecological context. In
Section “Input and Output Analysis” we present a summary of the
forest governance intervention timelines and the deforestation
trends observed. In Section “Characterizing Processes in PGM
and SFX” we present a categorization of the processes in the two
case study municipalities, and in Section “Comparing Processes
to Reduce Deforestation Across Five Indicators” we compare the
processes through the lens of five key indicators identified from
the literature on jurisdictional approaches. In Section “Lessons
for Jurisdictional Approaches” we conclude the paper with a
summary of lessons learned for jurisdictional approaches.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
This paper performs a two-case (“cross-case”) or comparative
case analysis (Yin, 2014). Case study analysis is the most suitable
method to address “how” and “why” questions and to investigate
a contemporary complex social phenomenon in depth and in its
real-world context, particularly when the boundaries between the
phenomenon and the context are not clearly defined (Yin, 2014).
This paper adopts the notion of context-inputs-process-outputs
(CIPO) that has been widely used in the literature of educational
impact evaluations and extends it to the land use sector
(Scheerens, 1990). The context (C) is understood as the socio-
economic and biophysical factors that shape outcomes (Börner
and Vosti, 2013; Wehkamp et al., 2018). The inputs (I) are
the interventions, including policies and initiatives, designed to
reduce deforestation and enhance land-use governance (Howlett,
2005). The process (P) is the way local actors implement specific
instruments and develop interventions in that particular context
(Birkland, 2011). Outputs (O) are deforestation trends in the
municipalities over time.
The analysis in this paper is broadly divided in two main parts.
In the first part (see Sections “Context” and “Input and Output
Analysis”) we briefly present the context (C), the inputs (I) and
the outputs (O), while in the second part of the paper (see sections
“Characterizing Processes in PGM and SFX” and “Comparing
Processes to Reduce Deforestation Across Five Indicators”) we
focus on the process (P). For the first CIPO element, the context
(C), we summarize the policy and socio-ecological contexts
that affect interventions in the two study municipalities by
drawing on peer-reviewed and gray literature. We understand
forest governance as a “set of regulatory processes, mechanisms
and organizations” through which state and non-state actors at
multiple levels shape forest-related actions and outcomes (Lemos
and Agrawal, 2006, p. 298).
To capture the inputs (I), we reviewed project reports,
governmental documents and other secondary sources
for each municipality to build a timeline of interventions
since the late 1970s/early 1980s (complete timelines are
presented as Supplementary Information). Outputs (O) were
measured using Brazil’s official forest monitoring data to assess
deforestation dynamics in the two municipalities through
changes in the extent of municipal deforestation between 2005
and 2018 (INPE, 2019).
To understand the process, we focus on the period since 2005
and perform two different analyses. First, we characterize the
processes in each municipality by linking context and the timing
of forest governance interventions (inputs) to deforestation
trends (outputs). Second, we provide a systematic comparison
of processes based on five indicators from the literature on
jurisdictional approaches: (1) the role of the government; (2)
multi-stakeholder participation and inclusiveness; (3) adaptive
management [as defined by Williams (2011)]; (4) horizontal and
vertical coordination; and (5) alignment of public and private
(supply-chain) initiatives. Along with data gathered during the
timeline construction, both analyses drew on data collected in
semi-structured interviews with a total of 102 key stakeholders
in the two municipalities (Paragominas n = 70 in 2013 and 2014;
SFX n = 32 between 2017 and 2019). Although the interviews did
not follow the exact same format in the two municipalities, they
document the main public and private initiatives implemented
since 2005, including their outcomes and limitations, the role of
different actors, and future outlook and expectations. We gave
more attention to farmers in the sampling effort given that they
are the direct agents of land use change in both municipalities.
Both methodological and data triangulation methods were used
to be sure we had enough reliable information and avoid biases
(Arksey and Knight, 1999).
All data collected were then leveraged to assess the role of
each respondent and organization in the process, the relevance of
specific initiatives, the role of local governments, the effectiveness
of multi-stakeholder processes, political coordination, and overall
perceptions of changes observed in each municipality. The main
TABLE 1 | Number of interviews per type of actor.
Actors Paragominas São Félix do Xingu
Farmers 39 13
Municipal government 7 8
NGOs 5 4
State or federal organizations 9 3
Private sector and banks 8 3
Others 2 1
Total 70 32
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changes that had occurred in both municipalities were also
captured through direct participation in local meetings and
discussions with municipal staff. Table 1 above lists the number
of interviews with each type of actor.
CONTEXT
Forestry-Related Policy Context in the
Brazilian Amazon and Its Multiple Levels
Today, 44.1% of the Amazon is covered by specific legislation
for forest protection. Indigenous Territories account for half the
area that is formally recognized as protected under federal laws
(Santos et al., 2013). Conservation units, protected areas created
by the National System for Protected Areas in 2000, make up the
other half. In addition to protected areas, another 6.2% of the
Amazon is under other special tenure regimes, which includes
colonization settlements governed by the Brazilian Agency for
Agrarian Reform (INCRA), i.e., federal areas designated for
agrarian reform purposes.1 These settlements may be either
federal land ruled by INCRA or state land, in the case of
Pará, ruled by the State Land Agency (ITERPA). The remaining
territory is privately held (22.7%) or unclaimed/with no clear
status (27%) (Santos et al., 2013).
Most forestry-related issues in the Amazon are governed
through the 2012 Brazilian Forest Code, which requires private
properties to maintain 80% forest cover as legal reserve, with
some exceptions. The Forest Code also instituted the Rural
Environmental Registry (CAR) system that has been in force
in Pará since 2006 and mandates the registration of all rural
properties to facilitate social and economic planning and the
monitoring of deforestation (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). State
governments may reduce the size of legal reserves in private
lands outside protected areas from 80 to 50% for the purpose
of compliance (but not as a permission to deforest legal
reserves above 50%), by designating certain areas as agricultural
production zones through Ecological–Economic Zoning plans
(Brito, 2019). This is the case of Paragominas and São Félix
do Xingu where the 50% rule applies in private areas. For
owners who have environmental debts, the Forest Code also
tasked state governments with creating an Environmental
Regularization Program to regulate the process of complying with
the minimum forest area required per property, in the case of
illegal deforestation after 2008. Smallholders are excluded from
having to restore legal reserves deforested before 2008 (Brito,
2017). Some of the state regulatory competences such as CAR
have been decentralized to certain municipalities in recent years,
but most of the responsibility remains at state-level.
Socio-Ecological Context of the Case
Studies
PGM and SFX are located in the eastern Amazonian state of Pará
(Figure 1). Although their demographic, temporal and economic
1The other two special tenure regimes are quilombola territories, which are
collective titles given to communities with proven African ancestry; and military
areas.
dynamics involve different processes as detailed below, both
municipalities were profoundly shaped by frontier expansion
dynamics associated with road building and colonization policies
during the military regime (1964–1985) (Tritsch and Le
Tourneau, 2016; Schmink et al., 2017). This period was marked
by intense conflicts over access to land between newcomers
and indigenous and traditional riverside dwellers, among the
newcomers themselves, and between newcomers and external
investors such as mining companies (Schmink and Wood,
2012). As in many other Amazonian frontiers, the predominant
economic model was based on environmentally degrading
activities such as logging, extensive cattle ranching and slash-and-
burn agriculture (Margulis, 2004).
Although frontier expansion started earlier in PGM (1960s)
than in SFX (1980s), both municipalities experienced high
rates of forest loss in their territories throughout the 1990s
and 2000s. By the mid-2000s, when Brazil started to plan
ambitious environmental policies which led to impressive
progress in forest governance (Hecht, 2012), PGM and SFX
were among the top-deforestation municipalities in the Amazon.
Consequently, when Brazil’s Federal Government intensified
actions to reduce deforestation and launched a list of critical
municipalities in 2008, both SFX and PGM were on it. The
list of highest deforesters identified the municipalities to be
subsequently targeted by command-and-control actions, such
as credit restrictions and field-based law enforcement (Cisneros
et al., 2015).2 This instrument ended up triggering the emergence
of local processes to curb deforestation in both municipalities
(Thaler et al., 2019).
Despite both being highly deforested municipalities in
absolute terms by the mid-2000s, SFX and PGM have had their
own occupation dynamics and differ significantly in size, tenure,
% of deforested area, and agrarian structure (Table 2). PGM
witnessed a land-use intensification and diversification process
involving the rapid expansion of mechanized agriculture and
an increase in timber plantations (Tritsch et al., 2016). This
intensification was largely because there were few unclaimed
areas to expand. At the same time, mining became an important
source of municipal revenue, particularly since the late 2000s. In
contrast, in SFX, livestock continued to expand, increasing the
size of herds and extending pastureland. This was associated with
the existence of large portions of unclaimed lands, particularly
at APA Triunfo do Xingu. According to IBGE agricultural census
(IBGE, 2017), nearly 90% of the municipal landholdings are
used for livestock activities, not only by large scale ranchers
but also by a substantial number of smallholders. In general,
smallholders tend to focus on breeding while larger actors tend
to specialize in raising and fattening cattle (Garcia et al., 2017).
In contrast to PGM, mechanization and grain crop production
have remained relatively low. Soybean is not yet produced in
SFX, and there are no records of timber plantations. Still, the
number of landholdings growing permanent crops is increasing
mostly due to the expansion of cocoa, a promising new crop
2The list of highest deforesters was one of the main instruments designed under the
Plan for the Protection and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAm),
the umbrella program that concentrated federal efforts after 2004.
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FIGURE 1 | Location of case studies.
TABLE 2 | Comparison of the context in Paragominas and São Félix do Xingu.
Similarities Differences
History of violence and absence of state. Territorial size: SFX (84,212.85 km2) is four times larger than PGM (19,352.25 km2) (IBGE, 2015).
Deforestation frontier triggered by governmental policies
between the 1960s and 1980s. High deforestation rates in
the 1990s and early 2000s (on the list of municipalities with
the highest rate of deforestation in 2008).
Land tenure: Most of SFX is covered by formally protected areas (Indigenous Territories cover 53%,
federal conservation units 6% and state conservation units 13%), while private landholdings
account for 22% and INCRA settlements account for 6%. Most PGM territory is mostly covered by
private landholdings (90%) while protected areas only include Indigenous Territories (5%). INCRA
settlements account for the remaining 5%.
Timber extraction and cattle ranching were predominant
land use activities in the past.
Agrarian structure: SFX is smallholder oriented: 88% of the properties and 17% of the area. PGM is
medium to large landholder oriented: 39% of the properties and 92% of the territory according to
the Agricultural Census (IBGE, 2006).
Source: own data.
among smallholders which, in 2017, involved approximately
1,355 families (IBGE, 2017).
INPUT AND OUTPUT ANALYSIS
Inputs: Forest Governance Interventions
Figure 2 provides a brief visual summary of the timelines of forest
governance interventions. The main similarities and differences
in efforts to reduce deforestation and promote sustainable land
use are listed in the following Table 3.
Outputs: Deforestation Trends
Both SFX and PGM mirror the general deforestation trends
in the Brazilian Amazon and witnessed a rapid reduction in
deforestation rates starting in 2005. In the case of SFX, an initial
period of abrupt reduction starting in 2011 was followed by a
period of stabilization at low rates and then by a slight increase
Frontiers in Forests and Global Change | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 96
ffgc-03-00096 August 13, 2020 Time: 15:30 # 6
Brandão et al. Lessons for Jurisdictional Approaches
FIGURE 2 | Forest governance timelines.
TABLE 3 | Similarities and differences between initiatives in Paragominas and São Félix do Xingu.
Similarities Differences
Most initiatives and jurisdictional actions were triggered by
federal command-and-control actions in the context of the
highest deforesters list.
External actors involved: in SFX, the federal government through the Ministry of Environment (MMA)
and NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC), International Institute of Education of Brazil (IEB)
and Institute of Forestry and Agricultural Management and Certification (IMAFLORA) assumed major
relevance. In PGM, the most important external actors since the mid-2000s were The Amazon
Institute of People and the Environment (Imazon), TNC, Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
(EMBRAPA) and, since 2014, the French Agriculture Centre for International Development (CIRAD).
Similar initial goals to get off the list. Reducing annual
deforestation rate to less than 40 km2 and have 80% of the
private municipal area under CAR. Municipal
zero-deforestation pacts signed (2011 in SFX and 2008 in
PGM).
The main municipal initiatives evolved in different ways. In SFX, this included a Post-Pact Agenda
2012 and a Municipal Low Carbon Agriculture (ABC) Plan 2016, both of which no longer operate. In
PGM, the process evolved from the Green Municipality initiative to an Integrated Municipal
Development Plan in 2019, which has just started.
Secondary goals to getting off the list included
environmental regularization and agricultural intensification
with support from external actors and projects.
Some secondary goals differed. PGM focused more on economic upgrading and forest restoration,
while SFX focused on economic alternatives for smallholders and indigenous peoples.
Despite their efforts, neither municipality has seen the
benefits of conditional climate finance (either carbon sales
or certification mechanisms).
Private sector initiatives differed. In SFX, the Cattle Agreement played a key role, while in PGM it
was the Soy Moratorium. The SFX case was also linked to a certain extent to REDD+ efforts while in
PGM that was not the case.
Source: own data.
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in recent years. In the case of PGM, deforestation stabilized at
residual levels in 2012. Figure 3 depicts the trends. However,
while reductions were similar, the overall trajectories differ. PGM
is an old frontier where deforestation started in the 1960s, mostly
linked to the construction of Belém-Brasília road. By 2005, 42% of
the municipal area was deforested and a significant proportion of
the remaining forests was undergoing degradation (Hasan et al.,
2019). By contrast, by 2005, SFX represented a new frontier with
only 16% of accumulated deforestation.
CHARACTERIZING PROCESSES IN PGM
AND SFX
Based on the context and analyses of inputs and outputs, along
with the interview data focused on actor perceptions we identified
three distinct moments in time in each jurisdiction.
Categorization of PGM
Command and Control (2005–2008)
PGM was subject to an initial phase of command and control
(2005–2008). In 2005, PGM was impacted by several federal field-
based law enforcement operations such as Curupira and Ouro
Verde. Since 2006, the municipality has also been monitored
by the Soy Moratorium, the main Amazon-level non-state
sustainability instrument in the soy sector (Piketty et al., 2015).
Yet, being added to the highest deforesters list in 2008 which
led to credit restriction and the launching of the Arc of Fire
operation, was the decisive moment. PGM faced heavy pressure
to reverse a situation which had severe negative social and
economic impacts for example due to the closure of illegal
sawmills and charcoal ovens, as consensually mentioned by
interviewees. This led the municipal government, with support
from the main local actors including timber entrepreneurs,
soybean growers and ranchers, to start negotiations with the
Ministry of Environment to produce a roadmap to get PGM off
the list. The first step was the announcement of a local zero-
deforestation pact in February 2008. In March, with support from
NGOs, PGM started to advance on CAR implementation and
deforestation monitoring (Coudel et al., 2013). Later in the same
year, the federal operation Rastro Negro, targeted illegal charcoal
production among smallholders. That was the last and decisive
law enforcement operation. Contrary to previous operations,
Rastro Negro was operationalized in close collaboration with
the municipal government, already engaged in the spirit to
reduce deforestation as a necessary step to get off the list. These
interventions became known as the Green Municipality initiative.
Green Municipality (2009–2014)
This phase corresponded to a period in which the Green
Municipality Initiative focused on municipal government’s legal
and operational capacity. That was particularly visible on issues
related to the environment, for example with the Charcoal Law
in 2009 (Coudel et al., 2013). In 2010, PGM was the first
municipality to be taken off the list and the criteria negotiated
with the federal government (annual deforestation rate of less
than 40 km2 and 80% of private properties under CAR) were
adopted as a federal regulation for other municipalities in the
Amazon. Simultaneously, the government of Pará incorporated
the Green Municipality guidelines and established a state-level
program using the same name, while local politicians took on
state-level roles. In parallel, the Pecuária Verde project targeting
livestock intensification and adoption of best management
practices also provided international visibility to local ranchers
(Silva and Barreto, 2014). During this period, PGM became
a symbol of sustainability in the Amazon. Smallholders and
indigenous groups were relatively absent from the political
success (Viana et al., 2016). The role of NGOs and external
actors was significantly reduced, particularly since the goal to get
off the list was achieved. Since 2013, when the new municipal
government took over, the term Green Municipality initiative
became obsolete and was no longer used. This phase ended
in 2014 when the Soy Moratorium was replaced by the Grain
Protocol in Pará. The new agreement has similar aims (to forbid
the sale of soybean produced in deforested areas) and took over
some of the Cattle Agreement conditions (Piketty et al., 2017).
Moving Beyond Zero Deforestation (2015–2019)
In the third stage, deforestation rates remained very low (below
25 km2 per year) and the aim of PGM moved to improve
local economy dynamics. Moreover, other ecological challenges
emerged, especially fires and forest degradation (Hasan et al.,
2019) which led to the need to combine more efficient production
systems, incentive mechanisms and forest restoration initiatives
(Osis et al., 2019). In 2015, 28 properties with forest reserves
deficits were allowed to become regularized through civil
law contracts with landowners with forest surpluses in the
same municipality (Brito, 2019). This was possible because
the municipality introduced a local law in 2014 regulating
compensation for deforested legal reserves (Piketty et al., 2015)
and became a pioneer in authorizing such a procedure in
Pará. Because the struggle to expand intensified cattle ranching
mostly concerned a small group of ranchers linked to the
political elite and efforts to access premium markets failed
(Silva and Barreto, 2014), the focus shifted to landscape-level
strategies. In this period, PGM launched an Integrated Municipal
Development Plan based on land use suitability and targeting
jurisdictional certification as a strategy to obtain funding and
market incentives. It also achieved the Verified Sourcing Area
status through the Sustainable Trade Initiative.3 Smallholder
participation in the local agenda is on the increase through
training efforts, institutional consolidation carried out jointly
with the smallholder union, and their involvement in the design
of the Integrated Municipal Development Plan.
Categorization of SFX
Command and Control (2005–2009)
The first stage, command and control (2005–2009), was
characterized by external initiatives that attempted to reduce
deforestation. These included the formal creation of federal and
3Verified Source Area is a concept based on a local pact between private and public
institutions to achieve some sustainable targets. Responsible investors or buyers are
connected with these areas, thereby valorizing local efforts for sustainability.
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FIGURE 3 | Deforestation trends in SFX and PGM between 2005 and 2018. Source: INPE (2019).
state conservation units, the inclusion of SFX on the municipal
list of highest deforesters in 2008, and two federal command-
and-control operations: Operation Boi Pirata and the Cattle
Embargo. These operations caused local tensions and revolt
(Sousa et al., 2016). They were nevertheless key moments that
triggered change in local perception: deforestation was no longer
acceptable and there was a need to look for alternative models
delinked from deforestation. Ranchers and slaughterhouses were
highly active in this period, particularly since the main target of
command and control was livestock production. The municipal
government and several smallholder organizations also took
an active part in local discussions. During this period, NGOs
played a leading role in promoting local negotiations, agreements,
capturing political attention, and fundraising. The Federal Public
Prosecutor’s (MPF) Office also took on a major role (throughout
the region) pressuring slaughterhouses and, indirectly, ranchers
to stop deforestation. MPF’s actions led to the legally binding
Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (referred here as Cattle
Agreement) in which the main slaughterhouses agreed not to
buy cattle from deforested areas.4 This stage ended with two
local meetings between all stakeholders that set the stage for
the beginning of a broad local agreement focused on reducing
deforestation in SFX (Neto and Silva, 2014).
Municipal Pact and Local Enthusiasm (2010–2013)
After the previous period of apprehension and revolt, optimism
and enthusiasm became the dominant trends in the municipality.
Several projects were implemented, or their main activities
peaked in this period, with efforts to get all the different
stakeholders on board. Many organizations opened local offices,
hired staff and received countless visitors. The Pacto Municipal
project became the structural intervention in the municipality
(Sousa et al., 2016). A local agreement on reducing deforestation,
4It implies not buying from areas on IBAMA’s embargo list, not being in an area
deforested after 2008, having UC and IT overlapping, nor being on the slave labor
list. The first step would be to join the CAR.
a multi-stakeholder forum and a post-pact agenda were the
main outputs of the project. This period was characterized by a
strong component of CAR implementation. To get off the list of
highest deforesters, municipalities were required to have at least
80% of their territory registered with CAR. Moreover, the Cattle
Agreement required slaughterhouses to only buy animals from
registered landholdings.
Building the capacity of both municipal governments and
civil society organizations was also important. Some of these
actions were linked to REDD+ efforts as SFX was selected as
an NGO-led pilot project. However, the REDD+ orientation did
not last long due to changing priorities of local organizations
(Gebara et al., 2019) and lack of donor funds. For instance, the
Municipal Green Fund created to support the development of
sustainable economic activities failed to attract funding. At the
end of this period, the limits of this strategy became apparent:
too much participation and focus on institutional capacity and
too little effort to promote economic alternatives to deforestation
started to cause disappointment. Despite positive results of
CAR implementation (SFX achieved 80% of CAR coverage in
November 2011), deforestation, which had reached its minimum
level in 2011, slowly started to increase again, particularly among
smallholders in INCRA settlements and at the APA Triunfo do
Xingu. Nonetheless, deforestation rates in private landholdings
outside APA remain low (below 10 km2 per year), suggesting a
positive effect of the Cattle Agreement, of CAR implementation
and of credit restrictions in these territories.
Disappointment and Value Chain Initiatives
(2014–2019)
With the end of Pacto Municipal project in 2014, local actors, in
particular smallholders, were faced with a slump in expectations,
according to interviews with their representatives. Several
organizations stopped their field activities in the municipality,
and, at the same time, multi-stakeholder forums became less
relevant. Most of the work on CAR implementation ended and
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the focus on capacity building moved toward improving land
use practices through value chain related projects. Among large
landholders, intensification and developing transparency and
traceability became priorities in the cattle sector. An important
attempt to solve the traceability problem was the Rebanho do
Xingu Seal. The seal guarantees zero deforestation throughout the
three production stages (breeding, raising, and fattening) through
the analysis of CAR and GTA (Portuguese acronym for the health
inspection document provided by the state agency ADEPARA).
The pilot initiative was able to identify around 500 beef cattle
raised on deforestation-free properties, whose meat was sold
at Walmart stores. However, this initiative stagnated as it was
unable to solve problems, including high implementation costs
and lack of market incentives for zero deforestation beef. Among
smallholders, the most important land use strategy became
restoration of degraded pastures with cocoa-led agroforestry
systems and the production of certified cocoa. Despite some
dynamism in the cocoa sector, up to now, initiatives in both
the beef and cocoa sectors have shown limited capacity to be a
game changer. In 2016, a municipal ABC plan was adopted as the
main development strategy and inherited a significant part of the
post-pact agenda. However, successive changes in the municipal
government reduced the ownership of these agendas. In recent
years, the focus has switched to themes such as credit, technical
assistance and clarifying land tenure, which are considered to be
the main structural constraints to broader adoption of improved
land use practices.
COMPARING PROCESSES TO REDUCE
DEFORESTATION ACROSS FIVE
INDICATORS
Table 4 below summarizes the main differences between the
processes at the two locations.
Government Role
Interestingly, government engagement in PGM and SFX differed
considerably. The PGM case was marked by strong municipal
government leadership in all phases, with particular relevance
to the first. The mayor of PGM quickly reacted when
federal command and control intensified and local actors were
apprehensive, and, in many cases, were willing to respond to
federal officials with violence. It was a risky decision as the
political dividends from opposing local interest groups who profit
from continued deforestation were not clear at the time. Yet,
given that the mayor’s leadership was accepted by the local
elite, the municipal government managed to find the local social
support required to achieve its primary goals. In contrast to PGM,
governmental involvement was more intermittent along the three
phases in SFX. Local responses to SFX being on the list of highest
deforesters, for example, were mainly led by third parties, such
as NGOs outside the municipality with donor support. Based on
our analysis of CIPO elements, we classified the process in PGM
as bottom up, i.e., led by actors at the municipal level whereas the
process in SFX was more top down, i.e., led by external actors.
Multi-Stakeholder Participation and
Inclusiveness
The SFX is clearly an example where the presence of external
actors and externally funded projects required the engagement
of a broad base of local actors through participatory processes.
Particularly in the second phase, many efforts were made to
strengthen the capacities of more marginalized groups, such as
smallholders and indigenous groups, and there was a strong
emphasis on building multi-stakeholder platforms.5 While the
rationale of these initiatives was to promote wide participation
as a strategy to strengthen ownership of governance processes
and, in this way, to achieve more effective results, too much
participation turned out to be counterproductive. According to
interviewees, too many multi-stakeholder platforms, countless
meetings and speeches that encouraged participation raised
high hopes among participants that were eventually not
fulfilled, leading to general demobilization and disenchantment.
Moreover, important players behind deforestation, such as land
speculators, were rarely targeted by participatory processes.
Conversely, the example of PGM was more selective and
elitist, as discussed by Viana et al. (2016). Despite the broad-based
pact signed virtually by all stakeholders, some groups including
smallholders and indigenous groups did not participate or even
influence the PGM strategy. Since most deforestation was taking
place on medium and large landholdings, and smallholders
accounted for only a small part of the territory, it was possible to
achieve deforestation targets without involving all stakeholders.
Despite their initial tense reaction, the local elites were ready to
take steps to achieve agricultural intensification and economic
diversification as pathways to curb deforestation. This attitude
was facilitated by PGM’s old frontier status.
Adaptive Management
As the process advanced in PGM and SFX (second and third
phases), the difference in governmental leadership between the
two municipalities was also reflected in their ability to manage
stakeholder expectations and take new steps. PGM responded
faster and quickly mobilized local actors. This pioneer status
and political capacity enabled the municipality to define the
rules to get off the list of highest deforesters. As such, the
local Green Municipality initiative became obsolete, which led
to a shift to new targets, such as the new Integrated Municipal
Development Plan and Verified Sourcing Area status described
earlier. By contrast, SFX took nearly 2 years longer to reach
a minimum agreement and had to accept the rules previously
defined by PGM. Moreover, as SFX is much larger and more
complex, despite tremendous effort and significant reduction in
deforestation, it was not able to reduce the annual deforestation
rate to 40 km2 to get off the list of highest deforesters. This led
to pessimism, as the expected benefits and satisfaction from the
efforts already attained did not materialize. Some interviewees
claim that this target is impossible for SFX given its size and,
hence, they argue that the success of PGM was the reason for
5Conselho Municipal do Meio Ambiente, Conselho Municipal de
Desenvolvimento Rural, Conselho Gestor da APA Triunfo do Xingu, Comitê
Gestor do Plano ABC, Comissão da Agenda do Pacto.
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TABLE 4 | Summary table comparing cases across the five indicators.
Indicators Paragominas São Félix do Xingu
Government role. Bigger governmental role and bottom up, i.e., led by
actors at the municipal level who partnered with
external actors.
Reduced governmental role and more top down, i.e.,
led by external actors to the municipality.
Multi-stakeholder participation and
inclusiveness.
In theory, inclusion of all groups, but in practice the
process was led by political and economic elites.
Strong emphasis on broad participation, inclusion of
vulnerable groups and formal participation through
multi-stakeholder platforms.
Adaptive management. Rapid response and pioneer status led to the
governmental capacity to control the process and to
adopt new targets.
Slower response and convoluted process. Despite
formal approval of new targets and goals, it was
impossible to operationalize them.
Horizontal coordination through cross-sectoral
policy alignment and vertical coordination
across different levels of government.
No initial horizontal coordination and only recent efforts
to build a coherent strategy. High vertical alignment with
both state and federal governments.
Huge effort to build sectoral policies but no capacity to
coordinate them. Exceedingly difficult coordination with
state (opposition political groups) and federal
governments (lack of contact).
Alignment of public and private initiatives. Soy Moratorium was effective for a time but there was
no alignment with public efforts. No market incentives
either for beef or soy.
Cattle Agreement fundamental in triggering local action
but no alignment with governmental action (only CAR
implementation at the beginning). No market incentives
for beef.
the failure of SFX. Notwithstanding, the changes in targets and
activities introduced in 2016 by the new Municipal ABC Plan did
not differ significantly from the previous arrangement, and in the
end were not substantially implemented.
Horizontal and Vertical Coordination
Both case studies revealed some efforts to promote cross-
sectoral policy alignment, but the processes mainly focused on
specific commodities and actors. Yet, a few differences were
apparent. In SFX, there has been since the second phase a huge
effort and investment to build sectoral policies, particularly by
NGOs. For example, several projects and activities focused on
indigenous livelihoods, economic alternatives for smallholders,
cattle intensification for medium and large-scale landholders,
and capacity building for local institutions. Yet, despite the
many efforts to align sectoral demands and transform them into
programs, their operationalization remains difficult. In PGM,
sectoral strategies targeting medium-large scale production of
commodities have long played a central role (for example
Pecuária Verde project). Recent instruments such as the Verified
Sourcing Area status and the Integrated Municipal Development
Plan were important steps toward promoting more coherent
strategies across the jurisdiction, although it is still too early to
judge whether this will be achieved.
The level of vertical coordination in the two cases differs
remarkably. On the one hand, PGM achieved high levels of
coordination with the federal government and even more intense
coordination with the state government in the first and second
phases. The operation Rastro Negro is one example of municipal
and federal collaboration. The adoption of Green Municipalities
as a state-level program and the spread of the PGM model
throughout the state is an example of effective collaboration
between the municipality and the state. Additionally, political
stability was stronger in PGM, linked to the central role that
local elites played in maintaining the political configuration.
Conversely, in SFX, there was a serious lack of vertical
coordination. Interviewees pointed to difficult articulation with
both the state government (opposition party) and the federal
governments (lack of contact). In SFX, distinct political groups
have been in power along the three phases, and nearly every local
election resulted in significant strategic changes in municipal
politics. The political setting is also very problematic in SFX since
two of the last four elected mayors were charged with corruption,
and one environmental secretary was murdered in the same
period. In most cases, articulation across governance levels was
led by NGOs that tend to have more permanent structures.
As many of the structural problems were related to lack of
operational capacity of state and federal agencies (for example,
related to APA Triunfo do Xingu and tenure regularization in
general) these problems remain largely unresolved which has
limited the capacity of SFX to progress.
Alignment of Public and Private
Initiatives
Both the Soy Moratorium and the Cattle Agreement, as initiatives
involving private commitments to remove commodity-driven
deforestation from their supply chains, played an important
initial role in both municipalities, as confirmed by interviews with
private sector representatives and farmers. PGM was particularly
targeted by the Soy Moratorium in the first phase, while in
SFX, the Cattle Embargo and later the Cattle Agreement played
a determining role in engaging local ranchers in the first and
second phases. In many cases, efforts to implement CAR were
directly financed by meatpackers and slaughterhouses. However,
the cases we analyzed point to a clear mismatch between public
and private efforts. On the one hand, corporate actors focus
on reassuring investors and buyers that their products are
deforestation-free, but are doing the minimum with respect
to environmental and social commitments, even some legal
requirements, as discussed elsewhere (Tonneau et al., 2017).
On the other hand, municipal actors target economic benefits
and long-term development. Since the private sector failed
to compensate farmers and local government for improved
sustainability through premiums or other market incentives,
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these actors have yet to see the benefits of aligning with
corporation aims. This was particular sensitive in the third stage
for example in the attempt to promote traceability and certified
beef through the Rebanho do Xingu Seal, which failed to create
a viable system to compensate ranchers. In part due to the lack
of incentives associated to the beef chain, in SFX the Cattle
Agreement lost effectiveness over time.
LESSONS FOR JURISDICTIONAL
APPROACHES
Jurisdictional approaches appear in current global agendas as
promising strategies to address deforestation, yet critical analysis
of existing experiences is lacking. The two contrasted municipal-
level efforts to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
highlighted in this study provide a broader understanding of
if, where and how local jurisdictional approaches can help
reduce deforestation. The case studies also help identify common
principles that could strengthen processes across diverging
geographic, social, economic and political contexts. In the
following sub-sections, we answer the five questions we posed in
the introduction.
Who Should Be Involved in the Design of
Jurisdictional Approaches?
By definition, governments are meant to be at the core of
jurisdictional approaches as their competence is required to
address the structural constraints driving deforestation. As seen
in PGM, strong government leadership was essential for progress.
Yet, in many forest frontiers, poor domestic policy and legal
frameworks, along with weak state monitoring and enforcement
capacity predominate. This leads us to question to what extent
jurisdictional approaches to reduce deforestation are possible
where state capacity and local authority to tackle deforestation
is weak. In such situations, the role of non-state actors should
not be underestimated, given their longer-term commitment to
supporting key interventions in certain municipalities even in
periods when local governments play a less active role.
How Should Tradeoffs Between
Inclusiveness and Effectiveness Be
Addressed?
Promoting equitable participation and mitigating risks of
unequal benefit sharing are important aspects of any strategy
to reduce deforestation. In that sense, multi-stakeholder
platforms and local participation more broadly have been
highlighted as key to preventing global agendas from capturing
local processes (Hovani et al., 2018) and promoting greater
equity and legitimacy in policy design and implementation
(Loft et al., 2017). However, multi-stakeholder platforms and
participation in general should be carefully addressed and
fine-tuned to local realities as they are difficult to implement
in practice and to maintain in the medium/long run. Our
findings confirm that not all problems can be solved through
the participation of diverse stakeholders (Larson et al., 2019).
Overvaluing participation as a box-ticking requirement
may also have counterproductive effects in the long run,
such as demotivation, if those responsible are incapable
of bringing about the necessary changes. In that sense,
understanding participation as a medium/long-term target
and accepting a certain level of tradeoff between inclusiveness
and effectiveness would be a more pragmatic approach. This
is particularly relevant in cases where deforestation drivers
are associated with specific local groups or where unequal
power relations between actors with conflicting priorities
may jeopardize processes (Rodriguez-Ward et al., 2018;
Sarmiento-Barletti et al., 2020).
How Can the Effectiveness of Local
Jurisdictional Approaches Be Measured?
Based on the experience gained in PGM and SFX trying to
get off the list, it is clear that it is not possible to impose the
same targets or expect the same rate and level of deforestation
reduction in all cases. Each jurisdiction is unique in terms of
features (e.g., spatial configuration, agrarian structure, land use
activities, or deforestation drivers), and is shaped by exogenous
factors (e.g., market trends, value chain configurations, and
different interventions that interact in distinct ways in each
jurisdiction). As a result, jurisdictions may be more or less
ready to halt deforestation, and reach net, gross, legal or illegal
zero-deforestation targets. While the final objective remains
important, it is at least as important to recognize the progress
made. This avoids a sense of failure that may wrongly delegitimize
the efforts invested and may call the leadership of the initiatives
taken into question. If such progress is not recognized, local
efforts might not be sufficiently valued by external observers,
donors or higher-level governments, which might lead to
contradictory actions and/or demotivate local stakeholders.
The problem of unrealistic expectations about achievements
or limited time frames to promote structural change has also
been mentioned elsewhere (Boyd et al., 2018). In that sense,
developing a transparent and participatory monitoring system
to highlight progress and identify gaps is a viable option. It
is not only a question of having a system that would allow
comparison between jurisdictions using general indicators. Such
monitoring should focus on what is progressing, what is not and
how local actors perceive those progresses and shortcomings.
This reinforces other claims that metrics need to be developed to
establish values, track progress and enable adaptive management
in ways that inform stakeholders understanding of the impacts of
their actions and what else needs to be done (Sayer et al., 2015;
Reed et al., 2016).
How Should Local Jurisdictional
Approaches Be Aligned With or Nested
in Higher-Level Approaches?
Coordination between levels of government is the key to
matching the scale associated with different challenges including
environmental regularization and land tenure (Reydon et al.,
2019). The authorities of subnational governments to address
deforestation vary from country to country; Brazil is one
of the countries where second-tier subnational governments
(i.e., states) have the greatest authority to reduce deforestation
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(Busch and Amarjargal, 2020). Interestingly, the emergence of
the local initiatives in PGM and SFX was in direct response to the
absence of state-level action in reply to federal command-and-
control actions. While, in theory local governments can better
understand and target local drivers, they require institutional
support at higher levels to solve critical issues. In some cases,
decentralizing state capacities may suffice to address those
structural constraints. But in cases where decentralization is not
possible or feasible, finding the right mix of local action to
promote ownership of processes and subnational action is the key
to solving critical problems. This prevents one-size-fits-all models
or universal recipes that may work in one place but not in others.
How Can Such Approaches Combine
Public and Private Actions?
Despite supporting efforts to strengthen synergies with
jurisdictional initiatives (Lambin et al., 2018), in general, supply
chain initiatives and private efforts have hardly dialogued with
governmental efforts at local level and even at subnational level.
Although they can provide an initial impetus in cases where
value chain actors are not sufficiently engaged, meaningful
market incentives have yet made their way in the Amazon and
corporations mostly do the minimum required to avoid criticism,
as has been the case at least in the soybean and beef chains. Private
action is still very modest and far below what would be needed to
promote and sustain change at local level, particularly as market
incentives are the key to maintaining local engagement and
guaranteeing progress. Since pay for performance incentives have
been “too low and too slow” to reach the ground (Seymour and
Busch, 2016), there are few remaining options than governmental
incentives and ad hoc non-governmental support to encourage
actors to pursue positive agendas and to continue pursuing them
in areas where progress is being made, at least until significant
external investments are available. In that sense, a transparent
and participatory monitoring system would also help local actors
to communicate externally and to attract private investment that
is truly engaged in promoting sustainability.
While our case studies suggest that there is still a long way
to go to build robust and sustainable long-term strategies at
local level, new opportunities are emerging. Major corporations
recognize that they will miss their 2020 zero-deforestation
global targets and are looking for new models and strategies to
rapidly implement their commitments. At the same time, the
global community is calling for enhanced ambition to achieve
the Paris Agreement goals, and new donor- and market-based
opportunities are developing with promises of increasing funding
for governments responsible for tropical forests. The extent to
which local jurisdictions will be able to design attractive strategies
for such investment, and finance will be able to reach the ground,
is uncertain, but surely both are required for success. In that
sense, it will be wise to start closing that gap as rapidly as possible.
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